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Organized intergroup violence is almost universally modeled as a calculated act mo-
tivated by economic factors. In contrast, it is generally assumed that non-economic
factors, such as an individual’s emotional state, play a role in many types of in-
terpersonal violence, such as “crimes of passion.” We ask whether non-economic
factors can also explain the well-established relationship between temperature and
violence in a unique context where intergroup killings by drug-trafficking organi-
zations (DTOs) and other interpersonal homicides are separately documented. A
constellation of evidence, including the limited influence of a cash transfer pro-
gram as well as comparisons with both other DTO crime and suicides, indicate that
economic factors only partially mitigate the relationship between temperature and
violence that we estimate in Mexico. We argue that non-economic psychological and
physiological factors that are affected by temperature, modeled here as a “taste for
violence,” likely play an important role in causing both interpersonal and intergroup
violence.
∗Affiliations: Baysan at University of Essex; Burke at Stanford University; González at Pontificia
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1 Introduction
The positive relationship between changes in temperature and violence has now been doc-
umented across diverse geographic settings and for many types of human conflict, ranging
from institutional collapse to civil war, riots, and crime.1 Yet the mechanisms underlying
these estimates remain poorly understood, and are of primary concern in order to inform
policies that can mitigate higher rates of conflict as temperature continues to rise (Dell
et al., 2014). While studies in the economics and psychology literature demonstrate that
rising temperatures can amplify interpersonal violence and aggression even when economic
factors are held constant, the role of non-economic factors in explaining broader patterns
of intergroup conflict remains unexplored. Such group-level conflict remains a key source of
premature death and livelihood loss throughout much of the developing world, and is almost
exclusively modeled as the result of a strategic and rational calculation, with physiological
or psychological factors not assumed to play an important role. Understanding whether this
assumption is correct is critical for a broader understanding of the origins of conflict, and an
understanding of climate’s role in a range of conflict outcomes.
Why might changes in temperature induce violence and conflict, and what can this tell
us about the broader underpinnings of violence? To date, economic models of violence treat
interpersonal and intergroup violence as different phenomena. Instances of interpersonal
violence, such as assault and murder, are generally thought of as “crimes” that may have
either an economic or emotional motivation—assaulting an individual in order to expropriate
their assets is clearly economic, whereas “crimes of passion” presume emotional factors. In
contrast, violence between groups of individuals is almost always modeled as a strategic
calculation where the economic costs of conflict are weighed against potential gains. In
many cases, this decision to focus on economic factors is well-motivated and generates sharp
predictions that often agree with data.2
Accordingly, economists often interpret the temperature-conflict relationship as largely
an income effect: hotter temperatures and lower rainfall are known to lower incomes, partic-
ularly in agricultural areas, and this in turn could temporarily lower the opportunity cost of
participation in violence. In an early study, Miguel et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence
1A meta-analysis finds that interpersonal and intergroup conflict rise by approximately 4% and 10% for
each 1 standard deviation increase in temperature, respectively (Hsiang et al., 2013). This implies a large
historical role for temperature variation in shaping conflict risk, and an even larger potential role for future
climate change in shaping these outcomes, given the anticipated > 4σ increase in temperature expected
across much of the tropics over the next century.
2See, for example, Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Miguel et al. (2004), Angrist and Kugler (2008), Berman
et al. (2011), Besley and Persson (2011), Dube and Vargas (2013), among others.
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that rainfall shocks that lower economic growth also increase the likelihood of civil war in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Chassang and Padró-i-Miquel (2010) explain this result by developing a
bargaining model in which violence occurs when a shock to economic productivity temporar-
ily lowers the opportunity cost to violence, but does not affect the future value of winning
the contest.
This economic explanation for a temperature-violence relationship, however, has difficulty
accounting for the observed response of individual-level violence to daily or even hourly
variations in temperature, as income is unlikely to change over these short periods (Jacob
et al., 2007, Card and Dahl, 2009, Larrick and et al, 2011, Ranson, 2014). Vrij et al. (1994)
offer perhaps the clearest case, where police officers were observed utilizing more violence
during a training exercise when temperature in the room was manipulated to be hotter.3
Thus, while interpersonal violence is often conceived of as an action with private costs and
benefits that also imposes costs on others (Becker, 1968), and which agents may rationally
undertake to affect the allocation of resources (Donohue and Levitt 1998, Chimeli and Soares
2017, Castillo et al. 2018), existing evidence indicates that non-economic factors are at least
partially responsible for generating the observed temperature-violence link at the individual
level.
Given that most instances of group-level violence are, at the most basic level, implemented
by individuals, this then suggests a potential additional role for non-economic factors in
intergroup violence. Consider the group member on the front lines of a conflict who is
personally implementing violence to further a group’s strategic objectives. There are many
decision points where non-economic psychological factors could play a role in his decision
making, with the individual having some discretion in exactly how much violence to employ
when contact with an opponent actually occurs. If the agent personally enjoys violence,
she may employ more of it when given some discretion over its use, and if the agent dislikes
violence she may employ less. Changes in the opportunity cost of violence will not necessarily
be the key determinant of the agent’s use of violence. If there are multiple opportunities for
non-economic factors to influence the individual’s use of violence, then non-economic factors
could become important determinants of the level of intergroup conflict.
We propose a unified framework in which both interpersonal and intergroup violence may
be influenced by both economic and non-economic factors, although their relative influence
may differ (making it ultimately an empirical question). We expand a standard economic
3 In another laboratory experiment, which is unfortunately rather poorly documented, Rohles (1967)
reports, “When [participants] were subjected to high temperatures in groups of 48, there was continual
arguing needling, agitating, jibing, fist-fighting, threatening, and even an attempted knifing. At lower
temperatures or in small groups, this behavior diminished.”
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model of violence by allowing the aggressor to experience pure consumption value from using
violence, which we model as a positive or negative input into utility, depending on the indi-
vidual’s “taste for violence.”4 Introducing this single non-economic factor and allowing it to
respond positively to temperature, as indicated by prior analyses, substantially improves the
ability of the model to account for observed patterns in the relationship between temperature
changes and intergroup violence.
We then test multiple hypotheses generated by this unified model in Mexico, a context
where exceptional levels of violence by drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs) motivated law
enforcement to gather separate data on intergroup homicides. This allows us to observe vari-
ation in comparable group-level and individual-level acts of violence, i.e., homicides in both
cases, in a single context where geographical, political, and institutional factors can be “held
fixed.” This provides a unique opportunity to compare the effect of temperature on both
interpersonal and intergroup violence without the comparison being confounded by contex-
tual differences that usually differ between studies.5 Such comparisons allow us to consider
whether these two types of violence might share a common non-economic mechanism.
Consistent with earlier meta-analyses, we show that higher monthly temperatures have
a positive and significant effect on both killings by drug-trafficking organizations (DTOs)
and “normal” (non-DTO) homicides in Mexico. Effects in both cases are contemporaneous,
large in magnitude, and generalizable across regions in Mexico. We find that a one standard
deviation increase in temperature is associated with a 28% increase in drug-related killings
and 5% increase in regular homicides.
We next use a variety of approaches to investigate whether these results are driven or
mitigated by economic factors. We find that economic mechanisms can only partially explain
the relationship between temperature and DTO killings, and they have almost no explanatory
power in the case of non-DTO homicides. For instance, changes in temperature have no
comparable effect on non-violent and primarily economic crimes committed by DTOs, such
4In a similar vein, Tauchen et al. (1991), Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997), Bowlus and Seitz (2006), and
Aizer (2010) explain domestic violence as expressive behavior that provides positive utility to some men.
Their partners tolerate it in return for higher transfers. Card and Dahl (2009) adopt this interpretation of
family violence as motivation to consider the role for emotional cues (or “visceral factors”) in precipitating
violence. They use unexpected losses in football games as the trigger for these emotional cues. A key
contribution of our paper is to extend this framework beyond domestic violence and to introduce these
psychological factors into the rapidly growing literature on intergroup conflict. Blattman et al. (2017) provide
experimental evidence on the role non-cognitive skills and preferences could play in shaping violence.
5Hsiang et al. (2013) compare results from 60 studies and find that the average effect of temperature on
interpersonal violence differs substantially from the effect on intergroup violence. However, each study only
examined one form of violence in a given context, and none were from comparable contexts (e.g., civil war
in African countries vs. domestic abuse in Australia), complicating the interpretation of differences across
categories of violence.
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as extortion and car theft, which we would expect to respond similarly to temperature if both
were caused by a single underlying mechanism. Similarly, exogenous variation in the level
of government social assistance through the large scale Progresa/Oportunidades program
has limited effect in dampening the effect of high temperatures on group conflict. Finally,
growing season temperatures matter little for harvest season violence, and other measures of
economic conditions and inequality have limited predictive power in explaining the observed
temperature-violence relationship.
Data on suicides in Mexico provide further evidence that psychological factors better ex-
plain the observed link between temperature and violence. Suicides, which could be thought
of as intrapersonal violence, are known to be heavily influenced by psychological factors,
and we show that the response of suicide to temperature in Mexico strongly matches the
responses of interpersonal and intergroup violence to temperature: the response is linear,
contemporaneous, common across regions, not mediated by observable economic factors or
Progresa/Oportunidades, and only barely affected by growing season temperatures. We in-
terpret this pattern-matching exercise as further evidence that psychological factors play a
role in temperature’s effect on group violence
Beyond our primary contribution to the understanding of the channels linking climate
and intergroup violence, our work broadens the “spectrum of violence” known to be affected
by climatic events (Figure 1). This includes evidence on large-scale institutional responses
to climatic change (Haug et al., 2003, Buckley et al., 2010), on more localized intergroup
conflict (Harari and Ferrara, 2018, Fetzer et al., 2019, Hsiang et al., 2011, Burke et al.,
2009), and on interpersonal conflict (Ranson, 2014, Larrick and et al, 2011, Jacob et al.,
2007). To our knowledge, our evidence on gang responses to temperature is novel. Gangs
are smaller and less organized than armed militias but larger and more organized than
spontaneous groups, such as mobs, both of which have been previously linked to extreme
climate. Similarly, we add to a small but growing literature on the link between suicide and
climate (Burke et al., 2018, Dixon et al., 2007). By further expanding and filling in this
spectrum of social phenomena affected by climate, this work bolsters our understanding of
how climatic conditions may affect the peacefulness of modern societies (Hsiang et al., 2013).
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2 Understanding Violence
2.1 Drug trafficking in Mexico
Drug trafficking organizations in Mexico appeared in the 1990s (Grillo, 2012) and have since
grown in size and sophistication, nowadays constituting an industry that earns between 14
and 48 billion USD annually (U.S. State Department, 2009). In addition to trafficking, these
organizations engage in extortion and kidnapping (Rios, 2014) and rose from 6 in 2007 to
approximately 16 in 2010 (Guerrero, 2012a).6
Starting in 2007 drug-related violence has increased dramatically, claiming more than
50,000 lives (Dell, 2015). Following the presidential election of 2006, president Felipe Calderón
declared war on drug trafficking organizations. Shortly after this event, crackdowns spread
through the country, and violence escalated to unprecedented levels (Merino, 2011, Guerrero,
2011b, Escalante, 2011). Several factors have been offered as causes: (1) Felipe Calderón’s
crackdowns and captures of DTO leaders (Guerrero, 2010, Chaidez, 2014, Calderón et al.,
2015, Dell, 2015, Osorio, 2015); (2) U.S.–Colombia efforts to reduce the supply of drugs
(Castillo et al., 2018); and (3) exogenous movements in international crop prices affects the
opportunity cost of joining the drug industry (Dube et al., 2016). The relative contribution
of each of these factors is, however, a matter of ongoing debate. To our knowledge, this is
one of the first papers to link DTO violence to climatic shocks.
To understand drug violence “on the ground,” we need to know more about DTO front-
line workers, how they were recruited, and how is violence taking place. According to the
Secretary of Defense department in Mexico, there are currently more than 500,000 DTO
workers, among them more than 75,000 children and adolescents. They are usually recruited
through more than 800 recruiting and training centers spread throughout the country (Cruz
Santiago et al., 2012), and local economic factors and opportunities seem to be an important
explanation behind the individual decision to join, both in rural and urban areas (Dube
et al., 2016, Dell et al., 2019). In implementing the DTO’s operations – violence, trafficking,
and other criminal activities – these are the individuals whose decisions might be affected
by climatic factors. Regarding the nature of violence taking place after 2007, Osorio (2015)
provides the most comprehensive data. As crackdowns diminished the power of incumbent
DTOs, competing organizations exerted effort to take control of these territories (Dell, 2015,
Osorio, 2015), resulting in violence between DTOs and with state agents in charge of the
6Most new organizations are factions of older groups and appear after traditional leaders are arrested
or killed (Guerrero, 2012b, Rios, 2013). Guerrero (2011a) discusses the issue of DTO fractionalization in
greater detail. See Table A.1 for characteristics of DTOs.
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crackdown. In line with this explanation, Osorio (2015) uses text analysis to study national
and local newspapers and finds that most violence in this period was between DTOs. While
we cannot rule out that non-gang victims are included in our DTO data, evidence in Osorio
(2015) suggest that most of the violence recorded as DTO killings was due to gangs fighting
gangs.
2.2 Non-economic factors in violence
A large body of research has dissected the logic of violence and documented the role that
economic factors can play (Miguel et al., 2004, Angrist and Kugler, 2008, Berman et al.,
2011, Besley and Persson, 2011, Dube and Vargas, 2013).7 This work would also seem
to provide a prima facie explanation for the now well-documented role that changes in
temperature appear to play in instigating violence and human conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013,
Burke et al., 2015), given that changes in temperature are also known to induce variation in
both agricultural and non-agricultural incomes (Hsiang, 2010, Dell et al., 2012).
Accumulating scientific evidence, however, also points toward an important role for phys-
iological and psychological factors in explaining certain types of human violence, and im-
portantly (for our purposes) also the potential for temperature to shape these non-economic
factors. For instance, the psychological roots of intrapersonal violence – i.e., suicide – have
been well documented, and the role of temperature in this particular type of violence, as
well as in interpersonal human aggression, have been explored by researchers since at least
the 1930s.8 While scientific understanding of temperature regulation in the human body
remains imperfect (e.g., Hammel 1974, Werner 1980, Cooper 2002, and Mekjavic and Eiken
2006)), there is growing evidence that neural structures are directly involved in this process
(Benzinger, 1970, Morrison et al., 2008, Ray et al., 2011). This is important because partic-
ular neurotransmitters that have been shown to participate in body temperature regulation
– in particular, serotonin – have also been linked to mood, emotion, and range of human
behaviors (National Institutes of Health, 2011, Lovheim, 2012). For serotonin specifically,
there is growing consensus that decreased serotonergic neurotransmission in the brain may
be an important deficit that leads to aggressive behavior (Edwards and Kravitz, 1997, Seo
et al., 2008). Thus there appears to be growing support in the medical literature for a physio-
7See Appendix A.1 for a brief review of the literature estimating the negative consequences of violence.
8See Appendix A.2 for a review of the literature estimating the relationship between temperature and
suicide and the seasonality of suicides. For example, Baron and Bell (1976) show that individuals were more
likely to behave aggressively towards others when ambient temperature was higher. Burke et al. (2018)
estimate the causal impact of temperature on suicides in Mexico and the U.S., and provide evidence of an
increase in aggression in online networks when temperature is abnormally high.
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logical link between temperature and violent behavior: when ambient temperature increases,
serotonin levels decrease, with attendant effects on impulsive and aggressive behavior.
A few recent studies provide complementary evidence that non-economic factors are
significant in explaining reduced form relationships between temperature on violence (Garg
et al., 2018, Blakeslee et al., 2018). These papers focus on interpersonal conflict, using a
similar empirical strategy to ours, and both conclude (in very different settings) that the
response of violent crime to temperature has a strong non-economic component. This work
complements our focus on understanding the mechanisms behind intergroup conflict.
3 Theoretical Framework
To understand how non-economic physiological and psychological factors might complement
the standard way in which economists have understood the logic of violence, we develop a
simple model of violence that builds on the framework in Chassang and Padró-i-Miquel (2010)
and incorporates a new mechanism affecting how high temperature can lead to violence. In
the model, two sides, i ∈ I = {1, 2}, decide whether or not to engage in costly violence and
redistribution when bargaining fails. The players cannot commit to not engage in conflict
for an infinite number of periods, where time is indexed by t. On the production side, each
side combines l units of labor, which we normalize to l = 1, with time-varying technology θt.
The sides can engage in two possible actions, namely being violent or peaceful, a ∈ A =
{V, P}, which they choose simultaneously. Both groups want to maximize their economic
output at the end of the game. If one player attacks first, then it has a first strike advantage
and captures all of the opponent’s output with probability p > 0.5. An attack costs both
the aggressor and defender a fraction c ∈ (0, 1] of output. If both agents choose to attack
simultaneously, they each win with probability 0.5. Additionally, we assume there is common
knowledge of a non-rival psychological consumption value of violence, which is a function of
temperature τ , i.e., γt = γt(τ) with
∂γt(τ)
∂τ
> 0, and γt(τ) ∈ R. If γt(τ) > 0 then the player
gains positive utility from engaging in violence. In terms of notation, we omit the argument,
τ , in setting up the model, but return to it when discussing its role in explaining violence
through different channels.
We consider a dynamic model where the two groups interact in every period t. There
is at most one round of fighting, and the winning group reaps the benefits of its prize into
the future. If there is no attack in the current period, then each agent expects a peaceful
continuation value V P , which is the discounted (δ) per capita utility of expected future
consumption from the player’s initial assets and which captures expectations of future values
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of all parameters. Similarly, if one side wins, then they have a continuation value of winning
V V , which is the per capita expected utility from consumption of both their initial assets
and the assets that they capture from their opponent through violence.




> p(2θt(1− c) + δV V ) + γt︸ ︷︷ ︸
value of violence
(1)
In terms of interpretation, a player finds it privately beneficial to choose peace if the per
capita value of consuming all output with initial assets plus discounted expected utility
under peace δV P (left hand side) exceeds the expected utility of consumption from both
the player’s original assets and captured assets, less expenditures on the conflict, plus the
expected continuation value pδV V and the psychological consumption value of violence, γt
(right hand side).
Rearranging (1), the condition for peace becomes:
θt(1− 2p(1− c))− γt > δ[pV V − V P ] (2)
where the left side of the inequality is the marginal value of peace in the current period
weighed against the discounted marginal expected utility from attacking (on the right side).
In considering the mechanism, the economics literature on conflict has focused on the
impact of temperature on θt in explaining violence. The left hand side of (2) shows that if
economic conditions are sufficiently bad (i.e., θt is sufficiently close to zero), and ignoring
psychological factors for the moment, conflict will occur. For example, a drought has a con-
temporaneous effect on productivity, which reduces the current opportunity cost of conflict
more than it alters the continuation value of peace (note that θt does not feature in the right
hand side).
Here we highlight the importance of the novel term capturing the non-rival psychological
consumption value of violence, γt. If climatic conditions influence γt by increasing the utility
(or decreasing the psychological cost) of acting violently, i.e., ∂γt(τ)
∂τ
> 0, then these changes
may increase the likelihood that (2) does not hold and violence occurs.9 Focusing on levels,
9An alternative would be to introduce a physiological mechanism discussed in the literature on cognition.
A number of studies have reported the importance of environmental factors, such as heat, on cognitive
performance (Mackworth 1946, Fine and Kobrick 1978). Fine and Kobrick (1978) found that heat has
significant effects on individuals’ ability to perform complex cognitive tasks involved in artillery fire and in
which they were trained. In the above model, we can think of this effect as an additive error term, ε, whose
variance increases with temperature, in which the players simply err in making their fighting decision, a
decision they might not make at lower temperatures.
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if both sides have a general distaste for violence (γt(τ) < 0), then there will be less conflict
than would be predicted by economic factors alone. Yet even in this case, if extreme climatic
conditions such as high temperatures decrease this psychological cost of engaging in violence,
∂γt(τ)
∂τ
> 0, the likelihood of violence would increase with temperature.
4 Empirical Framework
4.1 Data and descriptive statistics
We collected monthly information on reported homicides and suicides at the municipality
level from Mexico’s Bureau of Statistics (INEGI) for the period between January 1990 and
December 2010.10 This data corresponds to the universe of homicides and suicides officially
reported. We split this time frame into a “pre-war” period between January of 1990 and
December of 2006, and a “war” period between January of 2007 and December of 2010 be-
cause drug-related killings (henceforth DTO killings) are only available for the latter period.
In the pre-war period there were 218,970 homicides and 55,206 suicides, with a monthly
per municipality average (standard deviation) of 0.44 (2.49) and 0.11 (0.77), respectively.
Homicides in this period include both non-DTO-related episodes and DTO killings.
We use the total number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants in a municipality as the
dependent variable, as is standard in the literature (see Hsiang et al. 2013). A municipality
in Mexico is similar to a city in the United States. Figure 2 shows the time series and cross
sectional variation for DTO killings and homicides for all municipalities. Table 1 presents
descriptive statistics for these variables in the two periods of interest. We observe an average
of 0.98 homicides and 0.21 suicides per 100,000 inhabitants per municipality-month in the
pre-war period, and an average of 0.83 homicides and 0.26 suicides between years 2007
and 2010. The variation in these variables is substantial, as shown by the within standard
deviations of 5.23 and 1.93 for homicides and suicides respectively. At the state level, some
have as many as 6.2 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants – an extremely high homicide rate.11
10This section discusses the main variables to be used in the empirical analysis. Additional data, and the
corresponding descriptive statistics, can be found in Appendix B.
11Monthly rate of 6.2 homicides in our dataset implies a rate of 74.4 homicides per 100,000 per year. This
is an extremely high homicide rate. To put this in perspective, the most violent country in the world in 2012
(Honduras) had a rate of 90.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, and the second most violent (Venezuela)
had a rate of 53.7. Figure A.1 also compare rates of these types of violence to the US. Homicide rates in
Mexico were twice as high in Mexico compared to the US in 2006 and have been rising ever since. Suicide
rates, however, are substantially higher in the US. Finally, and not surprisingly, organized crime killings are
far higher in Mexico, a difference that has again been increasing since 2006.
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DTO killings were compiled by a committee with representatives from all ministries of
the National Council of Public Security in Mexico. The committee met weekly to classify
each homicide as drug-related or not. A drug-related homicide was defined as one civilian
killing another one with at least one involved in drug trade. The data is available from
December 2006 to December 2010 at the municipality level. There were a total of 34,436
DTO killings between 2007 and 2010, with an average (standard deviation) of 0.29 (3.94)
killings per municipality-month. The variation in this variable is striking, with roughly 20%
of state-months having zero killings and some having as many as 452.12 Panel B in Table 1
presents descriptive statistics for this variable. DTO killings rates are roughly half the size
of homicides rate during this period, and the distribution is more skewed.
Figure 2 shows time averages (weighted by population) for DTO killings (2007-2010)
and homicides (1990-2006) in all municipalities in Mexico. Homicides seem to be decreasing
during this time period, something analyzed in more detail by Escalante (2011).13
Finally, we construct monthly temperature and precipitation for each municipality-month
using data from Willmott and Matsuura (2014). This is a gridded dataset with monthly in-
formation for cells of size 0.5 degrees.14 In order to transform this gridded dataset into a
municipality-level dataset, we take the average of temperature and the sum of precipitation
for all pixels inside the polygons that represent Mexican municipalities. Municipalities dur-
ing our sample period have an average temperature of 20 degrees celsius, with a standard
deviation of 5.0 degrees celsius. However, after removing municipality, year, and month
fixed effects, following our econometric specification (below), the standard deviation of this
variable at the municipality-month level is approximately 2.8 degrees celsius. Figure A.4
presents the distribution of temperature by period.
12Our results are robust to excluding states with a large upward trend in DTO killings, i.e. Baja California,
Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Sinaloa, and Tamaulipas. Results are also robust to including state specific
trends, as discussed below.
13Dube and Ponce (2013) study violence in Mexico before 2006. These authors find that an expiration that
relaxed the permissiveness of gun sales caused an increase of roughly 239 deaths annually in municipalities
close to the relevant state borders.
14“Gridded weather datasets use interpolation across space and time to combine available weather station
data into a balanced panel of observations on a fixed spatial scale or grid. This approach deals with the
problem of missing observations at a given station or missing data because a station does/did not exist at a
particular location. (...) Each “grid” approximates a weather measure for the spatial unit by interpolating
the daily station data while accounting for elevation, wind direction, rain shadows, and many other factors.”,
(Auffhammer et al., 2013).
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4.2 Econometric strategy
To estimate a causal link between temperature and our dependent variables of interest, we
follow Deschenes and Greenstone (2007), and the preferred method employed by Hsiang
et al. (2013) (see Dell et al. 2014 for a review). Accordingly, we control for unobservable
time-invariant factors at the municipality level that could be correlated with both average
temperatures and violence, unobserved shocks common to all municipalities within in a state
in a given year, and average seasonal patterns in both temperature and violence. Specifically,
in our preferred specification we estimate the following regression:
ynsmt = βTempnsmt + δPrecipnsmt + ξm + λt + ζn + εnsmt (3)
where ynsmt is the number of DTO killings, homicides, or suicides per 100,000 inhabitants
in municipality n, state s, month m, and year t; ξm and λt are full sets of month and year
fixed effects; ζn is a full set of municipality fixed effects, respectively; Tempnsmt is average
temperature, measured in degrees celsius; Precipnsmt is total precipitation, measured in
thousands of millimeters; and εnsmt is an error term clustered at the state level. In robustness
tests, we also estimate equation (3) adding state-specific linear time trends (to account for
differential state-level trends in, for instance, policies to fight violence), or replacing the
month-of-year fixed effects ξm with state-by-month-of-year fixed effects ξsm—to account for
state specific seasonality in violence and temperature; there is some evidence, for instance,
for seasonality in suicides in particular (Ajdacic-Gross et al., 2010). Our main coefficients of
interest are β and δ, which are identified through natural exogenous fluctuations in weather
conditions, conditional on location and time effects. After demonstrating that our results
are robust across specifications, we report results from (3) for most of the analyses.
We also present temperature response functions using the number of days in a set of bins
and estimates of the effect of leads and lags of temperature on violence. The latter exercise
is important for a number of reasons. First, there may be temporal displacement: it may be
the case that an event that would have occurred in the future anyway is triggered earlier by
extreme climatic conditions. With full displacement, the contemporaneous and lagged effects
would be of similar magnitude but opposite in sign, and there would be no overall effect
of climate on violence. Even with partial displacement, a sole focus on contemporaneous
impacts could overstate the total effect of a change in temperature.
Lags can also be useful in identifying delayed or persistent effects. For example, a neg-
ative temperature shock during the growing season in an agricultural based economy may
increase violence during the harvest season when income for the farming season is realized (a
delayed effect), or a weather shock could trigger a conflict that persists for multiple periods.
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Finally, the temporal pattern of response to temperature shocks could also shed light on
the mechanism underpinning the response. Given that we are using monthly data, certain
income effects (such as the agricultural income story just told) might be expected to show
up with a few-month lag. Physiological effects, on the other hand, would be expected to
show up contemporaneously, given the immediacy of the body’s thermoregulatory response.







δkPrecipnsmk + ξm + λt + ζn + εnsmt (4)
where all variables are defined as before, and we include six monthly leads and six lags
of temperature. Our interest lies in the parameters βk and δk. In particular, a violation
of our identification assumption would be reflected in any of the coefficients (βt+1, ..., βt+6)
being statistically different from zero, i.e., future climate variation should not be correlated
with past violence. Persistent effects or displacement would translate into the coefficients
(βt−6, ..., βt−1) being statistically different from zero.
5 Climate and Violence
Figure 3 non-parametrically displays the relationship between temperature and measures of
group and interpersonal violence (DTO killings and homicides, respectively), with municipality-
, year-, and month-fixed effects partialled out of both the dependent variables and temper-
ature. The x-axis is interpreted as the average temperature in a given municipality-month,
and the y-axis is interpreted as deviation from that municipality-month average in the cor-
responding measure of violence. For reference, a one standard deviation in the temperature
variable within a municipality corresponds to 2.8 degrees celsius. The thick line corresponds
to the non-parametric conditional mean, while the lighter color depicts the 95 percent con-
fidence interval. These temperature response functions are clearly upward sloping for both
variables, and appear roughly linear through most of the temperature support.
Table 2 presents regression results from estimating equation (3) under various sets of
fixed effects. To facilitate the interpretation of these coefficients, and comparison across
outcomes and studies, standardized effects are presented in square brackets, which we express
as percentage change in the dependent variable per one standard deviation change in the
climate variable of interest. The first three columns show results using DTO killings per
100,000 inhabitants as dependent variable, and the last three show corresponding results for
homicides in the pre-2007 period.
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Several interesting patterns emerge. First, we observe a positive and significant effect of
temperature on both intergroup and interpersonal violence, a result that is robust across all
specifications. The magnitude of these estimates varies across columns, but is particularly
large for DTO killings: in our base specification (Column 1), we find that a 1σ increase in
temperature in a given month is associated with a 28% increase in the rate of DTO killings.
This result is robust to inclusion of either state-specific time trends or state-month FE. Given
the large level of killings during this period – over 34,000 DTO killings over the 2007-2010
period – a 22% increase is large in both percentage and absolute terms. The roughly 5% effect
for homicides is smaller in magnitude, but is also substantial given again the high homicide
rate in the country over the period (285,000 total homicides during the 1990-2010 period).
We find no statistically significant effect of precipitation on either intergroup or interpersonal
violence, and in all specifications we can confidently reject large effects of precipitation. The
effects of climate on violence in Mexico appear to occur through temperature.
Why is the impact of temperature shocks on violence larger for organized groups?15
Although our setting prevents us from providing a complete explanation, we believe there
are at least three leading possibilities that merit further exploration. First, DTO operatives
on the ground might be more equipped to engage in violent behavior (i.e., they are often
armed) and as a result temperature shocks might have a larger impact on them. Second,
DTO individuals might simply be more violent by nature, either because they were trained
by the organization with that purpose or because they were selected from the population in
part due to an underlying tendency to violence. Third, social interactions within or across
groups could exacerbate the effects of temperature. Examples of these potential “social
multipliers” are peer effects within groups and retaliation across groups.
Anticipating our more formal treatment of treatment-effect heterogeneity below, in Figure
A.2 we explore whether there are apparent spatial patterns in the responsiveness of DTO
killings or homicides to temperature. We estimate state-specific responses of violence to
temperature, and display these in the figure as the ratio of the state-specific estimate to the
pooled country-wide estimate reported in Columns 1 or 4 of Table 2 – i.e. β̂s,y
β̂y
. Although
there is some apparent variation in estimated effects across states, results are remarkably
homogeneous: point estimates are positive in all states for DTO killings and positive in
all but one state for homicides, the ratio of state-specific estimates to pooled estimates is
near unity for most states, and in the case of DTO killings, in only 4 out of 32 states do
confidence intervals on state-specific estimates not contain the pooled estimate (equivalent
15Although a meta-analysis finds a larger effect of temperature on intergroup violence (Hsiang et al.,
2013), the results in Table A.3 cannot reject that the temperature response is similar for homicides and
DTO killings. However, this result needs to be interpreted with caution because it only uses data for the
2007-2010 period.
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to 13% of states, only slightly higher than what sampling variability alone would predict).
For homicide, there does appear to be somewhat more variation in effect sizes across states,
with 38% of state-specific confidence intervals not containing the country-wide estimate (8
estimates are significantly larger than the pooled estimate, 4 are smaller). Below we explore
more extensively whether economic factors can explain this heterogeneity.
Finally, as shown in Figure 4, our benchmark estimates of how intergroup and inter-
personal violence respond to temperature in Mexico are remarkably consistent with other
reported temperature-conflict estimates from the literature (none of which were from Mex-
ico). Figure 4 plots the distribution of standardized coefficients from an earlier meta-analysis
(Hsiang et al., 2013), showing in the bottom two panels either the 24 studies from Hsiang
et al. (2013) that examined intergroup conflict or the 12 studies that examined interpersonal
conflict. The estimated effects for DTO killings and homicides from Mexico lie within the
expected distributions for intergroup and interpersonal conflict, respectively. In particular,
in the existing literature a one standard deviation rise in temperature increases interper-
sonal violence by 4% and intergroup conflict by 14%, quite close to the 4.5% and 22.8% we
estimate for homicides and DTO killings, respectively, in Mexico.
6 Economic Factors
6.1 Other DTO criminal activities
Can economic factors explain the strong and robust relationship between temperature and
violence in Mexico? In the absence of a way to experimentally manipulate the income of drug-
trafficking organizations, we approach the problem indirectly. First, we study whether other
(plausibly) economically-motivated DTO criminal activities also respond to temperature.
Besides killings, drug trafficking organizations are also known for other criminal activities
such as kidnappings, extortion, and car thefts. These crimes appear to have a clear economic
motivation, and so if economic factors such as income are what is mediating how DTO
violence responds to temperature, a similar temperature response might be evident in these
similarly economically-motivated activities.
We assembled administrative data on the monthly occurrence of kidnappings, extortion,
and car thefts during the period between January of 2007 and December of 2010. Unfor-
tunately these data is not available at the municipality level but at the state level instead.
Table 3 present the estimates of interest, and include our main results on DTO killings and
homicides for comparison. Strikingly, we do not observe any significant relationship between
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temperature and these other criminal activities. In fact, estimated coefficients have a neg-
ative sign in the case extortions and kidnappings, although are not statistically significant,
and the effect on car thefts is fairly small and not statistically significant. Temperatures
appear to increase violent crime but not these other criminal activities.
6.2 Income, unemployment, and inequality
The first approach suggests that the observed relationship between temperature and violence
cannot be explained by an economic mechanism. To further substantiate the argument that
psychological factors drive the results, our second approach is to look directly at whether
municipality-level income variables mediate the temperature-violence relationship. To do
this, we augment equation (3) and include an interaction term between temperature and
various measures of income or income inequality at the municipality level. In particular,
we examine interactions with municipality-level income and with the municipality-level Gini
coefficient.
Results are shown in Table 4. We find little evidence that these municipality-level mea-
sures of income mediate the temperature-violence relationship. For the per-capita income
measure, the interaction has the expected sign for DTO killings, but is statistically insignif-
icant and the coefficient is small: a one standard deviation increase in log GDP per capita,
which we think of as being a fairly large increase in income, attenuates the effect of tempera-
ture on DTO killings by 13 percent (−0.008/0.063 ≈ 0.13). The interaction in the homicide
regression is also statistically insignificant, and is of the opposite sign than expected.
Another economic measures is economic inequality, measured here with time-invariant
municipality-level Gini coefficients (constructed by Jensen and Rosas 2007). Income inequal-
ity has been argued in the literature to be an important driver of violence and conflict in
different settings. But as shown in the table, it does not appear to substantially affect how
either intergroup or interpersonal violence respond to temperature in Mexico. In the case of
DTO killings, a one standard deviation in inequality decreases the effect of temperature on
violence by roughly 12 percent, but it is not statistically significant.
Finally, we explore the mediating influence of two other variables that are typically
correlated with income: the adoption of air conditioning (typically positively correlated
with income), and municipality-level average temperature (negatively correlated with income
across countries as well as across Mexican states).16 Air conditioning could be viewed as an
16Davis and Gertler (2015) find a positive relationship between household income and air conditioner
adoption within warm areas of Mexico; adoption in cooler areas is close to zero.
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income-related adaptation, and as such could represent an alternative pathway through which
higher incomes could break the link between temperature and violence.17 The “mediating”
effect of higher average temperatures on the response of violence to temperature deviations
is perhaps more subtle. One the one hand, states with higher average temperatures might
be more adapted to hot temperatures, and thus less effected by additional increases in
temperature. On the other hand, if the underlying temperature response is non-linear (as
in agricultural productivity), then additional heat exposure on top of an already high mean
should induce a more negative response.
Results of including air conditioning penetration or average temperature as interaction
variables are show in columns 3 and 7 of Table 4. The evidence on whether either variable
mitigates the temperature-violence response function is inconclusive. The estimates are not
statistically significant, but we can bound the potential for mitigation: there is at most a
10-12% reduction in the effect as a response to an increase of one standard deviation in
AC penetration. Thus we find little additional evidence of income-induced adaptation (at
least through the AC channel), nor strong evidence that hotter average temperatures reduce
impacts (through adaptation) or worsen them (through non-linearities).
6.3 Quasi-experimental variation in monetary transfers
Our third approach to studying the role of economic factors is to exploit the roll-out of a
large-scale conditional cash transfer program, Progresa, which induced quasi-experimental
variation in income across much of Mexico during our study period. Progresa is a very
large program, with a budget of approximately 133 million USD in 1997 (roughly 0.03% of
GDP), which has since expanded to almost 5 billion USD in 2010 (roughly 0.5% of GDP). In
terms of the roll-out of the program, the government originally chose 320 treatment and 185
control rural villages. The former villages were located in 110 municipalities, were chosen
at random, and received the first treatment in August 1998; the latter villages received the
treatment two years later (Skoufias et al., 2001).
After 2002, municipalities treated first were presumably more vulnerable. This is because
the government used a variety of methods to identify eligible households, including estimates
of household income and self-selection methods with ex-post verification of eligibility (more
details in Levy 2006). Nevertheless, because our estimation strategy employs local fixed
effects, exploits the timing in the implementation of the program using monthly variation,
17Barreca et al. (2016) find that the effect of higher temperature on mortality declined dramatically over the
course of the 21st century in the United States. They show that the diffusion of residential air conditioning
explains nearly all of this decline.
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and temperature shocks are unlikely to be correlated with program roll-out, this feature of
the program should not bias our results.18
In terms of the data, we observe bimonthly transfers to every municipality during the pe-
riod between January 1998 and December of 2009 from administrative sources. Importantly,
cash transfers in this program targeted women with children, and so we cannot be certain the
extent of income variation that the program induced among the population likely to partici-
pate in DTO related activities (young men).19 Nevertheless, we augment our main regression
equation by including the logarithm of Progresa transfers as an additional independent
variable, and an interaction term between this variable and temperature.
Results from this exercise are presented in Table 5. First, transfers alone seem to de-
crease the rate of DTO killings, although the effect is relatively modest and not statistically
significant: an increase of 10 percent in transfers decreases killings by 0.1 percent. The
effect is smaller in the case of homicides and not statistically significant. Regarding the in-
teraction term, the coefficient is also negative and marginally significant in the case of DTO
killings, which suggests transfers also modestly decrease the local sensitivity of violence to
temperature, but it is again a fairly precise estimated zero in the case of homicides.
In Figure A.5 we also incorporated an interaction term between leads and lags of Pro-
gresa transfers and temperature and we reach the same conclusion: transfers modestly
decrease DTO killings, but only contemporaneously, these have no effect on homicides, and
the interaction term is marginally significant and negative only for the case of DTO killings.
Overall, it seems that even large monetary transfers to poor households in a very high-profile
anti-poverty social assistance program can only slightly reduce levels of intergroup violence
and have no effect in the case of interpersonal violence – again subject to the caveat that
we cannot be sure how much of this income reached those individuals likely to participate
in DTO activities.
6.4 Harvest and growing season effects
Our final approach to exploring the role of economic factors is to study whether temperature
shocks during economically critical periods have a greater impact on violence compared to
shocks at other times in the year. In particular, as a substantial portion of the Mexican
18In fact, the results in this section are virtually identical in the Progresa phase (1998-2001, coef. -0.003,
p-value 0.67) and the Oportunidades period (2002-2006, coef. -0.003, p-value 0.38).
19This is one reason our results likely diverge from Fetzer et al. (2019), who shows that the relationship
between monsoon shocks and insurgent conflict is largely eliminated in India after the introduction of a
public employment program (NREGA) that guaranteed wage labor to everyone.
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labor force continues to earn their living in agriculture (roughly 15%), and as agricultural
income has been one of the most salient variables emphasized in the literature as a potential
mediating factor between climate and conflict, we examine the effect of temperature during
the growing and harvest seasons relative to during non-agricultural seasons. More precisely,
we construct an indicator variable that takes the value of one for the months of April to
September, which is considered the rainy season for the majority of Mexico and includes
both the canicula and pre-canicula period.20 The harvest season indicator variable, on the
other hand, takes on a value of one during the months of October to December.
We perform two different analyses. In the first one, we simply augment our main re-
gression equation with an interaction between temperature and the indicator variable for
the growing season. Our expectation is that this interaction will be positive if agricultural
income is a mediating factor and if agricultural incomes (e.g., wages) respond rapidly to
changes in temperature. Given that these income shocks might occur with some lag, with
hot temperatures during the growing season only showing up as negative incomes shocks af-
ter crops have been harvested a few months later, our second approach studies how violence
in the harvest season reacts to temperature shocks during the growing season.
Results are shown in Table 6. We find that temperature shocks during the growing season
appear to reduce DTO killings somewhat, the opposite of what the agricultural income story
would suggest, with the coefficient on the interaction not significant at conventional levels.
For the test on whether growing season shocks affect harvest season violence, point estimates
for both DTO killings and homicides are positive, but standard errors are too large to be
able to rule out either zero effect or large positive or negative effects. Finally, we also include
interaction terms with the percentage of households living in rural areas and the percentage
of workers in the agricultural sector, and find similar results. Taken as a whole, these results
provide little evidence that agricultural income is the critical mediating factor.
7 The role of non-economic factors in violence
Results from section 6 suggest that economic factors have only limited power to explain
the observed effect between temperature and both intergroup and interpersonal violence
in Mexico or to mitigate what we argue is at least in part a psychological channel. We
find that changes in temperature do not affect other economically motivated non-violent
crimes, that other measures of economic conditions such as municipality-level income do not
20Canicula is a mid-summer drought period in Mexico. Both the growing and harvest season were specified
following Skoufias (2012), who examines the effect of weather shocks on household welfare in Mexico.
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predict the temperature response, that random variation in governmental income assistance
have only a modest dampening effect, and that growing season temperature shocks are not
differentially harmful. None of these results is definitive on its own, but together they suggest
that economic factors are unlikely to be the driving force in explaining the large response of
violence to temperature in this setting.
How can we directly show that psychological factors instead at least partially explain the
link between temperature and violence? Because inducing experimental variation in these
psychological factors is logistically challenging (and, arguably, ethically undesirable), our
approach to understanding their potential role is again indirect. In particular, our basic
approach is a “pattern-matching” exercise, where we study whether the response pattern of
group violence to temperature matches the response pattern of another type of violence that
is almost certainly lined to psychological factors – intrapersonal violence, i.e., suicide.
Suicide has long been understood to have a substantial psychological component. For
instance, the medical literature tells us that psychiatric disorders are reported present in at
least 90% of suicides (Mann et al., 2005), propensity toward suicidal behavior is strongly
associated with genetic inheritance (Brent and Melhem, 2008), and randomized controlled
trials suggest that suicide risk can be substantially shaped both by medications and by
psychotherapy (Mann et al., 2005). Researchers have also long recognized the role that
changes in temperature might play in shaping suicide risk, although the literature is currently
inconclusive as to whether stark seasonal patterns in suicide (which characteristically peak
during warm spring and summer months) are due to temperature per se or to other factors
that also vary seasonally (see Appendix A.2 for a review of this literature).
Using an identical econometric strategy to that used for DTO killings and homicides
above, and building on recent work in Burke et al. (2018), we begin by showing that suicides
in Mexico also respond strongly to deviations from average temperature. The non-parametric
relationship between suicide and temperature is shown in Figure 5, and corresponding re-
gression results are given in the first column of Table 7. As with DTO killings and homicides,
the temperature-suicide relationship appears strongly linear, with an estimated standardized
effect of a 7% increase in suicide per σ increase in temperature (Table 7). This estimate falls
between the estimated effects for DTO killings and homicides. As with these latter outcomes,
the suicide response also appears fairly homogenous across states, with positive estimates in
all but 2 states (see Figure A.2-C).
As with DTO killings and homicide, we then explore whether the temperature-suicide
relationship is mediated by economic factors. This is, in essence, a further gut check on
whether suicide is a fair “benchmark” for an outcome that we presume is mainly non-
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economic in nature. Results from including interactions with income, inequality, Progresa
transfers, and growing season temperature are shown in the remaining columns of Table
7. Most coefficients on interactions are small and statistically insignificant, and the two
interactions with statistical significance have signs that go in the opposite direction than
what the typical income story would suggest: higher average incomes appear to slightly
worsen the impact of hot temperatures, and hotter-than-average growing seasons appear to
reduce the impact of temperature.
As a final pattern matching exercise, we study the temporal pattern of how intergroup,
interpersonal, and intrapersonal violence respond to temperature, using the leads/lags ap-
proach described in equation 4. As discussed above, studying the temporal pattern of re-
sponses can help shed additional light on mechanisms, since income effects might be expected
to show up with some lag in monthly data but physiological effects should show up imme-
diately. Studying lags also allows us to understand whether contemporaneous effects are
simply “displacement”, causing violence to occur earlier than it would have otherwise, but
not changing the overall level of violence. Studying leads offers a simple placebo test, as
idiosyncratic variation in future temperature should not affect current violence.
Results from estimating equation 4 on all three outcomes are shown in Figure 6, with
point estimates and confidence intervals for contemporaneous effects, 6 lags, and 6 leads
plotted for each outcome (for instance, a value of “-1” on the x-axis corresponds to the
effect of temperature in month t − 1 on violence in month t). Although estimates are
again more imprecise for DTO killings due to the smaller sample size, a number of common
patterns are apparent. First, statistically significant effects occur only in contemporaneous
periods for all three outcomes. That is, the most robust predictor of violence in a given
month is temperature in that month, suggesting that the primary effects of temperature are
immediate. We interpret this as additional evidence in favor of physiological mechanisms,
since these would be expected to respond immediately to temperature change.
We also find evidence of some displacement, with lagged coefficients for both homicide
and suicides negative and (for suicides) significant. In absolute value, these coefficients are
about 1/3rd the size of the contemporaneous effects, suggesting that roughly one-third of the
temperature-induced increase in homicides and suicides were events that were likely to have
occurred anyway. Interestingly, we do not see a similar pattern for DTO killings, although
generally larger standard errors on the DTO estimates limit our ability to say anything very
precise. Finally, results on the leads (our placebo test) are largely reassuring, with most
point estimates of the 6 leads near zero and none statistically significant. There are thus two
imperfect but consistent pieces of evidence that non-economic factors could explain some of
the temperature-violence relationship. The first is that a known psychologically-dependent
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outcome, suicide, responds in a strikingly similarly way to changes in temperature. We view
the extent of this similarity as unlikely if suicide did not share some underlying commonalities
in terms of mechanism with these other forms of violence. The second is that the effect of
temperature on all types of violence that we measure is immediate – i.e., that it occurs in the
same month as the temperature shock – which is inconsistent with the most obvious income-
related stories in which temperature reduces agricultural output, given that the period in
which crops are sensitive to temperature is temporally disjoint from the period in which
harvest income is realized. Again, each of these pieces of evidence on their own might
not be convincing, but together they suggest a substantial role for non-economic factors in
explaining how both intergroup and interpersonal violence in Mexico respond to changes in
temperature.
8 Conclusion
Using municipality-by-month variation in temperature, we find significant contemporaneous
effects of temperature on DTO killings, homicides, and suicides in Mexico. Estimated effects
are economically meaningful for each outcome, and imply that temperature can induce large
additional increase in violence on top of already high baseline levels of both DTO killings
and homicides. This is the first study to our knowledge to find such a similar relationship
across a spectrum of violence outcomes in a single setting, and our estimated effects are
surprisingly consistent with existing estimates in the literature from other contexts.
Using a variety of approaches and data, we assess whether non-economic factors are
contributing to the results. A constellation of evidence, including the limited influence
of a cash transfer program as well as comparison with economically-motivated non-violent
DTO crimes, indicate that economic factors can at best only partially explain the observed
relationship between temperature and violence or mitigate what we argue is a psychological
channel. We present two pieces of of more direct evidence that suggest a role for non-
economic factors in explaining the temperature-violence link for group- and interpersonal
violence: the substantial similarity between how these outcomes respond to temperature and
how suicide responds to temperature, and the immediacy of the response of these variables
to changes in temperature.
We draw two tentative policy implications from our findings. The first is that, at least
in this particular setting, standard economic interventions might not be an effective tool
for shaping how violence responds to changes in climate. Second, our results are equally
pessimistic on the role for adaptation in shaping this response, with neither higher average
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income levels nor specific interventions that alter how individuals experience climate (i.e., air
conditioning) appearing to affect how violence responds to temperature. More speculatively,
reducing future temperature increases through emissions mitigation, rather than trying to
induce adaptation through policy intervention (or hoping that it will occur on its own),
thus unfortunately may be the most fruitful strategy in this setting for limiting the violent
consequences of future climate change.
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Notes: These figures present non-parametric estimates of equation (3). Temperature re-
sponse functions for DTO killings (upper panel) and homicides (lower panel) using temper-
ature bins of width 3◦C. The x-axis is interpreted as the average temperature in a given
municipality-month, and the y-axis is interpreted as deviation from that municipality-
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Notes: Top panel presents estimated standardized effects and confidence intervals from
this study. Bottom panels show the distribution of standardized effects of climate on
interpersonal (e.g. rapes) and intergroup (e.g. civil conflict) outcomes from Hsiang et al.
(2013).
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Notes: This figure presents non-parametric estimates of equation (3). These temperature
response functions use bins of width 3◦C. The x-axis is interpreted as the average tem-
perature in a given municipality-month, and the y-axis is interpreted as deviation from
that municipality-month average in suicides per 100,000 inhabitants.
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Table 2: Temperature and violence in Mexico
Dependent variable: DTO killings Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temperature 0.058** 0.066** 0.053*** 0.016*** 0.023** 0.014***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.019) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003)
[28.4] [33.6] [26.9] [4.7] [7.0] [4.3]
Precipitation 0.016 -0.013 0.025 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009*
(0.041) (0.027) (0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
[2.7] [-2.2] [4.2] [-0.4] [-0.1] [-0.9]
Municipality F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month F.E. Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Month–state F.E. No No Yes No No Yes
State trends No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 117,458 117,458 117,458 493,908 493,908 493,908
Notes. Each observation corresponds to a municipality-month. Estimates of equation (3)
using data for all municipalities in Mexico in different periods (2007-2010 in columns 1–3,
1990-2006 in columns 4–6). State trends is a complete set of year indicators interacted with
state indicators. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Standardized
effects in brackets. All regressions are weighted by population. Levels of significance are
reported as ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
39
Table 3: Temperature and economically motivated crimes
Dependent variable: DTO killings Homicides Car thefts Extortions Kidnappings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature 0.050** 0.050** 0.067 -0.005 -0.001
(0.024) (0.023) (0.092) (0.004) (0.001)
[22.8] [13.7] [1.7] [-4.5] [-3.1]
Precipitation 0.080 -0.285 -0.363 0.220 0.060
(0.447) (0.411) (2.430) (0.255) (0.036)
[0.8] [-1.7] [-0.2] [3.9] [6.2]
Mean of dep. variable 0.737 1.217 13.414 0.407 0.070
(Within st. dev.) (0.962) (0.827) (5.600) (0.360) (0.088)
Municipality, year & month F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,536 1,535 1,535 1,535 1,534
R2 0.649 0.714 0.886 0.603 0.392
Notes. Each observation corresponds to a state-month. Estimates using data for all states in
Mexico in the period 2007 – 2010. All dependent variables are rates per 100,000 inhabitants.
Source is Secretariado Ejecutivo del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP). Stan-
dard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Standardized effects in brackets. Levels





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Non-Economic Factors in Violence:
Evidence from Organized Crime, Suicides and Climate in Mexico
A Literature Review
A.1 Consequences of violence
There is a large literature in economics and political science documenting the negative effects
of crime, conflict, and war (from now on “conflict”) on different outcomes. For example, in
relatively new papers researchers have documented the effect conflict has on health outcomes
(Bundervoet et al. 2009, Baez 2011, Akresh 2012, Akbulut-Yuksel 2014b), human capital
formation (Blattman and Annan 2010, Shemyakina 2011, Chamarbagwala and Moran 2011,
León 2012, Verwimp and Van Bavel 2014, Akbulut-Yuksel 2014a), labor outcomes (Kondylis
2010, Fernandez et al. 2011, Bozzoli et al. 2012), consumption (Serneels and Verpoorten 2013,
Velasquez 2019), agricultural investment (Singh, 2012), firm exit (Camacho and Rodriguez,
2012), family formation (Akbulut-Yuksel et al., 2013), wages and prices (Rozo, 2019), and
the development of institutions (Voors, 2014). Reviewing this large literature is beyond the
scope of this paper, but it is clear that conflict has increasingly negative and pervasive effects
in societies.21
Researchers have also started to document the consequences of the dramatic increase in
violence after 2007 in Mexico. For example, Rios (2014) shows that cities on the U.S.–Mexico
border have received relatively more Mexican immigrants in recent years, despite the fact
that Mexican immigration to the U.S. reached its lowest point since 2000 across the country
as a whole (Cave 2011, The Economist 2012). Other researchers have estimated the impact
on labor markets. Robles et al. (2014) use an instrumental variables approach and finds that
violence has had negative effects on labor participation and unemployment, and caused a
decrease in local economic activity.22 In the same line of research, Velasquez (2019) uses a
differences-in-differences approach at the individual level and finds that increased violence
(i) decreases labor market participation and the number of hours worked by self-employed
women, (ii) decreases hourly and total earnings of self-employed males, and (iii) decreases
per capita expenditure. In addition, Brown (2018) findings suggest that the escalation of
violence decreased average birth weight by 70 grams (∼ 40 percent), and by ∼ 120 for
mothers with low socioeconomic status.23 In a related study, Leiner et al. (2012) results
21See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for a review of the literature before 2010, and Miguel and Roland (2011)
for long-run consequences of violent events.
22The same authors also find evidence of spillovers from homicides to other criminal activities such as
extortions, kidnappings, and car thefts, something also noted by Guerrero (2010) and Brown (2018).
23For comparison, this effect is larger than estimates of the positive impact on birth weight of federal
i
suggest that exposure to violence causes mental health problems (e.g. depression, anxiety,
attention, aggressive behavior).
A.2 Seasonality in suicides
For empirical studies analyzing the relationship between temperature and suicides see Ro-
hden (1933), Mills (1934), Pokorny et al. (1963), Grove and Lynge (1979), Dixon and Shul-
man (1983), Chiu (1988), Marion et al. (1990), Souetre et al. (1990), Linkowski et al. (1992),
Barker et al. (1994), Salib and Gray (1997), Jessen et al. (1998), Preti and Miotto (1998),
Yan (2000), Leung et al. (2002), Deisenhammer et al. (2003), Lee et al. (2006), Ajdacic-Gross
et al. (2007), Preti et al. (2007), Hajat et al. (2007), Qi et al. (2009), Toro et al. (2009),
Ruuhela et al. (2009), Tsai (2010), Likhvar and Honda (2011), Kim et al. (2011), Yang et al.
(2011), Inoue et al. (2012),Helama et al. (2013), Holopainen et al. (2013). See Ajdacic-Gross
et al. (2010) and Christodoulou et al. (2012) for a review of the literature on the seasonality
of suicides, Deisenhammer (2003) for a review of the literature on weather and suicides until
2003. See Burke et al. (2018) for a summary of the more recent studies.
B Additional Data
In this section we describe our additional data sources and the construction of variables
associated with it. We proceed describing variables in the same order that they appear on
the main text.
B.1 Drug Trafficking Organizations
We use a number of variables related to the presence of a drug trafficking organization (DTO)
in a state. In particular, we use two sets of variables: (1) the number of DTOs operating in
a state s in year t, and (2) the shares of the state where the DTOs “Sinaloa” and “Zetas”
operate. We define a share of some DTO as the total number of municipalities where that
DTO operates over total number of municipalities in that state. We chose these two DTOs
because anecdotal evidence (and some quantitative evidence we show later on) shows that
the Zetas have been trying to take control over the territory controlled by Sinaloa, and hence
many DTO killings seem to be associated with this rivalry.
The data we use to construct these variables comes from Coscia and Rios (2012). These
authors use newspapers and blogs, aggregated through Google News, as sources of informa-
tion to estimate where DTOs operate. In particular, they generate a panel dataset of all
municipalities in Mexico, observed yearly between 1990 and 2010, with ten indicator vari-
ables (one for each DTO). These indicator variables take the value of one if the corresponding
DTO is operating in that municipality.
nutrition programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children, and the
Food Stamp Program in the United States.
ii
There are two main differences between this DTO dataset and ours. First, we work with
states in our analysis, while DTO operations are recorded at the municipality level. Second,
our time interval is a month, while DTO operations are recorded on a yearly basis. To
facilitate exposition, let k = 1, . . . , 10 represent a certain DTO. To merge DTO operations
with our dataset we collapse the yearly data at the state level and create (i) a series of
indicator variables DTOkst that take the value of one if a DTO k is operating in state s and
year t, and (ii) the corresponding state shares previously described. When doing this we
assign yearly information to all months in that year.
Then, we construct our three main variables in the following way. The variable DTOs
is simply the sum of DTOs operating in state s and year t, i.e. DTOst =
∑10
k=1Dkst. The
shares are defined as previously mentioned. In order to show some evidence for the rivalry
between Sinaloa and the Zetas, we collapsed our dataset at the state-year level and ran the
following regression:




where yst is DTO killings for each 100,000 inhabitants, α is a constant term, λt is a year fixed
effect, ζs is a state fixed effect, DTOkst are ten indicator variables, and εst is an error term
clustered at the state level. Then, a DTO k is classified as violent if βk > 0 and is statistically
significant. Figure A.3 presents estimates of this regression equation. Note that the Zetas are
operating in every state-month in our sample, so these regression estimates effectively show
how DTO killings respond to the presence of DTO pairs of Zetas and another organization.
We can see from this figure that the only DTO pair that is statistically associated with DTO
killings is the one Zetas-Sinaloa. Sinaloa operates in 46 percent of state-years in our sample
period. Descriptive statistics for all these variables are presented in Table A.2.
B.2 Criminal activities
In Table 6 we use a different data source to measure (1) homicides, and we add three variables
measuring criminal activities that have a clear economic objective: (2) kidnappings, (3)
extortions, and (4) car thefts. This data was collected by the Secretariado Ejecutivo del
Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública (SESNSP) at the Mexican Secretariat of the Interior
(Secretaŕıa de Gobernación).
To incorporate this information into our dataset we downloaded it from the website of
the Mexican Secretariat of the Interior. The raw data is transformed into rates per 100,000
inhabitants in the state using population census data. The only exception is car thefts.
When using this variable we add up the raw variables robo de veh́ıculo con violencia (violent
car theft), and robo de veh́ıculo sin violencia (non-violent car theft) to create a variable
we call “car thefts”. There are, on average, 39 homicides, 2.4 kidnappings, 13 extortions,
and 515 car thefts in a state-month in the period between January of 2007 and December
of 2010. Table A.2 presents descriptive statistics for these variables in rates, showing the
overall standard deviation, and the deviation after removing state, year, and month fixed
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effects.
Although these variables are available at the state-month level for the period 1997–2014,
we only use them for the period 2007–2010 to be consistent with our empirical analysis.
Finally, we refer the reader to Merino (2011) for a comparison between this alternative
homicide variable and the two variables we use in our main empirical analysis (i.e. DTO
killings and homicides from Mexico’s Bureau of Statistics).
B.3 Economic variables
In Table 4 we use a series of economic variables. Log GDP per capita is measured in 1999
at 1993 prices and the source is Mexico’s Bureau of Statistics (INEGI). Houses with air-
Conditioning is the saturation of residential air-conditioning, from the National Household
Income and Expenditure Survey of 2010 (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los
Hogares), officially managed by the Mexico’s National Bureau of Statistics since 1984. This
is a nationally representative survey of rural and urban areas. This measure is based on an
indicator variable for whether a household has an air-conditioning unit, which falls under
the category of durable goods. This measure was then aggregated to the state level using
ENIGH sampling weights. Gini is an income inequality index constructed by Jensen and
Rosas (2007) using the 1990 and 2000 Mexican national census. The authors calculate the
Gini indices using methods proposed by Abounoori and McCloughan (2003) and Milanovic
(1994). Finally, Unemployment is monthly unemployment data for each state from the
National Survey of Employment and Occupation, and is available since March of 2005 until
the end of our period of study.
B.4 Progresa transfers
In Table 3 we use variation in income generated by the program Oportunidades in Mexico.
This social program started in 1997 with the name of Progresa (Programa de Educación
y Salud, Education and Health Program), and it consisted of conditional cash transfers that
targeted poor families in marginal rural areas between 1997 and 2002. A main feature of
this program is that it included an evaluation component from its inception. From 2002 the
program changed its name and scope and began to incorporate urban areas as well. The
budget for this program was approximately 133 million USD in 1997 (∼ 0.03% of GDP),
and it has expanded to almost 5 billion USD in 2010 (∼ 0.5% of GDP).
We downloaded bimonthly monetary transfers to each state from the program’s official
website. This information is available for the Oportunidades program, i.e. from 2002
onwards. In our empirical analysis we use the logarithm of one plus the total amount of
bimonthly transfer to a state. Less than 2% of observations correspond to no monetary
transfers (i.e. transfer equals zero) in the period we analyze. We take a bimonthly transfer,
e.g. 100 USD in January-February, and we split it equally between both months, i.e. 50 USD
in January and 50 USD in February. Descriptive statistics for this variable are presented in
Table A.2.
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B.5 Wage and unemployment
In Panels A and B of Figure A.6 we plot the average bimonthly income and unemployment
of agricultural and non-agricultural workers in Mexico. To construct this data we use the
National Household Survey of Income and Expenditure (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y
Gastos de los Hogares), officially managed by the Mexico’s National Bureau of Statistics
since 1984. This is a nationally representative survey of rural and urban areas, and is done
every two years since 1992. For these calculations we use the years 1989, 1992, 1994, 1996,
1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004.
The interviews for this survey are done between the months of July and October. One
part of this questionnaire constructs, retrospectively, workers’ income in the past 6 months.
In addition, the occupation of the individual is always part of this questionnaire. Exploiting
variation in the distribution of interviews, and classifying individuals in the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors, we were able to construct (i) average monthly income, and
(ii) percentage of individuals without income, both from February to October. Finally,
we construct two months bins from these numbers to estimate seasonality in income and
unemployment for both sectors.
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Table A.1: Operation of Mexican drug cartels
Municipalities Start Years
Cartel in 2010 Year Entry Exit Operated
Sinaloa 176 1993 25.6 17.0 2.8
Golfo 244 1994 35.6 23.5 3.0
Juárez 74 1997 13.9 10.2 2.8
Tijuana 39 1997 10.1 8.2 2.7
Zetas 405 2003 42.2 22.0 2.8
Beltrán-Leyva 157 2004 18.7 10.8 2.1
Fam 227 2005 18.8 7.4 2.1
Barbie 66 2006 5.8 2.5 1.6
Mana 32 2006 3.8 2.2 2.2
Sinaloa* 53 2008 5.2 2.5 2.0
Beltrán-Leyva* 57 2008 5.0 2.2 1.8
Other 24 2008 2.2 1.0 1.4
Source: Table 1 in Coscia and Rios (2012). Entry is the average number of municipalities cartel k
enters in a year. Exit is the average number of municipalities cartel k exits in a year. Years operated
is the average number of years cartel k operates in a municipality. *Factionalized cartel.
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Homicides 1.22 1.54 0.83 0 11.92
Kidnappings 0.07 0.11 0.09 0 0.90
Extortions 0.41 0.57 0.36 0 5.91
Car thefts 13.41 16.56 5.60 0 112.00
Drug trafficking organizations
DTOs 6.30 2.47 0.92 1 10
Sinaloa 0.03 0.05 0.03 0 0.27
Zetas 0.21 0.21 0.08 0 0.94
Other
Log Progresa transfers 17.24 3.75 2.88 0 20.16
Notes: Descriptive statistics for all 32 Mexican states at the month level during the period between January
of 2007 and December of 2010.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Temperature 0.064* 0.073* 0.013* 0.018*
(0.034) (0.039) (0.007) (0.010)
× DTO killing 0.003 -0.015 -0.002 -0.010
(0.010) (0.020) (0.003) (0.007)
Municipality (n), year (y) & month (m) F.E. Yes No Yes No
F.E. n, y, m by type of violence No Yes No Yes
Observations 234,916 234,916 234,916 234,912
Notes: Each observation corresponds to a municipality-type-month, where type is the homi-
cide rate or the DTO killing rate. Data for all municipalities in Mexico in the 2007-2010
period . Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. The standardization
in columns 3 and 4 takes the dependent variable and subtracts the type-specific mean and
divides by the type-specific standard deviation . All regressions are weighted by population.
Levels of significance are reported as ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A.4: Including temperature in the previous month
DTO killings Homicides Suicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Temperaturet (α) 0.035** 0.063 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.007***
(0.016) (0.046) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Temperaturet−1 (β) 0.020 -0.007 -0.006***
(0.036) (0.004) (0.001)
Temperaturet+1 (β) -0.017 0.003 0.000
(0.032) (0.004) (0.002)
α + β 0.055* 0.046** 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.032) (0.019) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
State, year & month F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,536 1,504 6,496 6,528 6,496 6,528
R2 0.649 0.644 0.697 0.697 0.472 0.470
Notes: Estimates for all 32 states in Mexico. All regressions include state, year, and month fixed effects,
and precipitation as control variable. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Levels of
significance are reported as ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table A.5: Drug trafficking organizations
Dependent variable is DTO killings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Temperature 0.050** 0.049** 0.048** 0.049* 0.046*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025)
× DTOs 0.005
(0.004)
× Sinaloa 0.279 0.242
(0.317) (0.306)
× Zetas 0.109 0.116
(0.086) (0.090)








Sinaloa × Zetas -21.777
(27.452)
Mean of dep. variable 0.737
(Within st. dev.) (0.962)
State, year & month F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.649 0.651 0.665 0.649 0.666
Notes. See Appendix for data on drug-trafficking organizations. DTOs is the number of cartels that are operating in State s
and year t. Sinaloa and Zetas are the shares of the state in which these DTOs operate. Share is defined as total number of
municipalities where they operate over total number of municipalities in that state. All regressions control for precipitation.
Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis. Levels of significance are reported as ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1,
+p< 0.11.
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Table A.6: Temperature and suicides in Mexico
Dependent variable: Suicides
(1) (2) (3)
Temperature 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.009**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
[7.4] [7.2] [8.7]
Precipitation -0.053 -0.034 -0.040
(0.039) (0.038) (0.047)
[-1.3] [-0.8] [-1.0]
Mean of dep. variable 0.321
(Within st. dev.) (0.167)
State F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes
Month F.E. No Yes No
Month–state F.E. No No Yes
State trends No Yes No
Observations 6,528 6,528 6,528
R2 0.470 0.490 0.499
Notes. Estimates for all 32 states in Mexico in period 1990–2006. State trends is a complete set of
linear trends interacted with state indicators. Standard errors clustered at the state level in parenthesis.
























































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Estimated effect of temperature on the outcome of interest for each state in Mexico. Coefficients
are expressed as percentage of the average coefficient for comparison across maps. Categories in these
maps correspond to intervals of the same size. Darker colors for larger coefficients. States colored in gray
indicate a negative estimated coefficient.
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Drug trafficking organization
Notes: This figure presents estimates βk of the following equation:




Where yst is DTO killings for each 100,000 inhabitants, α is a constant term, λt is
a year fixed effect, ζs is a state fixed effect, DTOkst are ten indicator variables, and
εst is an error term clustered at the state level. According to our definition, DTO
number 7 is then classified as violent.
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Temperature anomaly (in celsius degrees)
2007-2010
Notes: This figure presents the distribution of temperature — net of state, year,
and month fixed effects— for (A) the period from January of 1990 to December of
2006, and (B) the period from January of 2007 to December of 2010.
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Notes: This figure presents estimates of the following regression:





γk(Progresas(m+k)t × Tempsmt) + φkProgresas(m+k)t
]
+ λt + ξm + ζs + εsmt
where everything is defined as in the main text, and Progresas(m+k)t is the logarithm
of Progresa transfers in state s, month m + k, and year t. The main effect of
temperature on DTO killings, homicides, and suicides (i.e. β) is plotted with the
corresponding color we use in the paper. In addition, this figure presents the effects
of progresa transfers three months before and after, interacted with temperature,
i.e. (γ−3, γ−2, γ−1, γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3).
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Two months bins
DTO killings Homicides Suicides
D
A Deviation (in %) from average wage for agricultural and non-agricultural workers
for two months bins (e.g. bin 1 is January and February). Data for November
and December is missing. B Percentage of individuals with wage equal to zero in
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. C National unemployment rate by month
using data from the National survey of occupation (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación
y Empleo), available monthly since 2005. D Estimated effect of temperature in a
particular month on the outcome on interest.
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